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Abstract 
I
3
 theory assumes that aggressive behavior is dependent on three orthogonal 
processes (i.e., Instigator, Impellance, and Inhibition). Previous studies showed that 
Impellance (trait aggressiveness, retaliation tendencies) better predicted aggression when 
Instigator was strong and Inhibition was weak. In the current study, we predicted that another 
Impellance (i.e., normative beliefs about aggression) might predict aggression when 
Instigator was absent and Inhibition was high (i.e., the perfect calm proposition). In two 
experiments, participants first completed the normative beliefs about aggression 
questionnaire. Two weeks later, participants’ self-control resources were manipulated either 
using the Stroop task (study 1, N = 148) or through an “e-crossing” task (study 2, N = 180). 
Afterwards, with or without being provoked, participants played a game with an ostensible 
partner where they had a chance to aggress against them. Study 1 found that normative 
beliefs about aggression negatively and significantly predicted aggressive behavior only when 
provocation was absent and self-control resources were not depleted. In Study 2, normative 
beliefs about aggression negatively predicted aggressive behavior at marginal significance 
level only in the “no-provocation and no-depletion” condition. In conclusion, the current 
study provides partial support for the perfect calm proposition and I
3
 theory. 
Keywords: aggression; self-control; normative beliefs about aggression; provocation; 
I
3
 theory. 
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When do normative beliefs about aggression predict aggressive behavior? An application of 
I
3
 theory 
INTRODUCTION 
Normative beliefs about aggression – one’s attitudes about the acceptability of 
aggression in a specific context – are an important factor that may influence aggressive 
behavior (Amjad & Wood, 2009). If people view aggression as being unacceptable, they are 
less approving of it (i.e., high normative beliefs about aggression) and aggress less, whereas 
people who believe aggression is acceptable (i.e., low normative beliefs about aggression) are 
more likely to aggress (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997). In this sense, high normative beliefs 
about aggression should be negatively related to aggression
1
.  
An increasing number of studies have investigated the association between 
normative beliefs about aggression and aggressive outcomes. For example, Huesmann and 
Guerra (1997) used a longitudinal design to study the predicted effect of normative beliefs 
about aggression on peer-nominated aggression in children, finding that normative beliefs 
about aggression serve as a significant predictor of aggressive behavior in older children. 
Similarly, other research has indicated that adolescents’ normative beliefs about aggression 
are significantly related to self-reported and other-reported aggression (Amjad & Skinner, 
2008; Werner & Nixon, 2005), cyberbullying (Ang, Tan, & Mansor, 2011), and mobile-phone 
aggression (Nicol & Fleming, 2010). These findings indicate a fairly robust relationship 
between normative beliefs about aggression and different types of aggressive behavior.  
                                                             
1 Normative beliefs about aggression are often assessed as the acceptability of aggression and thus it should be positively 
related to aggressive behavior (e.g., Huesmann & Guerra, 1997). However, in this study, our scoring system for normative 
beliefs about aggression was the opposite of that used by Huesmann and Guerra (1997). Therefore, currently higher 
normative beliefs about aggression indicated people were less accepting of aggression and thus should be negatively related 
to aggressive behavior.  
I3 THEORY AND AGGRESSION                                                                      4 
 
 
 
However, previous studies have demonstrated that the strength of the relationship 
between personality traits (e.g., normative beliefs about aggression) and aggressive behavior 
is influenced by environmental factors (e.g., provocation, for a review, see Bettencourt, Talley, 
Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006). Appreciative of this issue, the I
3
 model was proposed as an 
explanatory framework for the factors influencing the occurrence of aggression (Finkel, 2014; 
Slotter & Finkel, 2011). In this model, the occurrence of aggression is jointly dependent on 
three processes, described in the next section. Based on this guiding conceptual framework, 
the current studies aimed to investigate the conditions under which normative beliefs about 
aggression predict aggressive behavior.  
Overview of I
3
 theory 
The I
3
 model (pronounced “I-cubed model”) is a metatheory that provides a guiding 
framework for the prediction of social conduct such as aggressive behavior (Finkel, 2014; 
Slotter & Finkel, 2011). According to this model, all behavior emerges from a combination of 
three orthogonal processes: Instigation, Impellance, and Inhibition. Instigation refers to the 
effect of exposure to a specific object in a particular context that normally motives aggressive 
behavior. For example, the various circumstances covered by the term provocation provide 
examples of instigation. Impellance refers to situational or stable factors which enhance the 
likelihood that the person will enact the behavior motivated by an instigator. To illustrate, 
people high in trait aggressiveness have a stronger tendency to respond aggressively to 
provocation than those whose trait aggressiveness is low. Inhibition refers to situational or 
stable factors that enhance the likelihood an individual will override the effects of Instigation 
and Impellance and decrease the likelihood of the aggressive response. For instance, people 
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with considerable self-control are more likely to inhibit the tendency to aggress than those 
whose self-control resources are depleted or who are low in trait self-control.  
Among these three processes, Instigation and Impellance are the push forces that 
drive people to enact a certain behavior, whilst Inhibition is the pull force which prevents 
people doing that behavior. These three factors generate several paths that address how one or 
more processes can potentially lead to a certain behavior (i.e., three main effects, three 
two-way interactions, and one three-way interaction; Slotter & Finkel, 2011). According to 
the “perfect storm” proposition (Finkel, 2014; Finkel et al., 2012; Slotter & Finkel, 2011), the 
likelihood and intensity of a behavior are highest when both Instigation and Impellance are 
strong and when Inhibition is weak. As such, individual behavior may be more accurately 
predicted by the interaction of these three processes than it can by investigating the effects of 
the processes independently of one another. 
Although several alternative theories also propose the co-effect of push and pull 
factors on individual behavior using different terminology (e.g., Lewin’s formula B = f (P, E), 
system 1 and system 2, etc.), I
3
 theory is different from existing theories in that it includes 
three processes rather than two. Also, of greater importance is that it cross-cuts the two 
processes in all dual-process models, and as such, I
3
 theory is considered to be a distinct 
theory – rather than an extension of – extant dual-process theories (for a review, see Finkel, 
2014). 
Previous studies investigating aggressive behavior have provided support for the 
main tenets of I
3
 theory. For example, with respect to the main effects of the three processes, 
prior studies have found the presence of an Instigator (e.g., provocation, social exclusion), 
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and strong Impellance (e.g., high dispositional aggressiveness), or weak Inhibition (e.g., low 
levels of trait self-control, self-control resource depletion) have a direct positive effect on 
aggressive behavior (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Finkel et al., 2012; Li, 
Nie, Boardley, Situ, & Dou, 2014; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001, for a review, 
see Denson, DeWall, & Finkel, 2012; DeWall, Finkel, & Denson, 2011). Regarding two-way 
interactions between the three processes in the I
3
 model, research has shown that people are 
more likely to aggress when either Instigator (e.g., provocation) or Impellance (e.g., 
dispositional aggressiveness) is strong and Inhibition (e.g., self-control resources, executive 
control) is weak (e.g., DeWall et al., 2007; Finkel et al., 2012). As for three-way interactions, 
to our knowledge few studies have so far incorporated all three processes when investigating 
aggression. In one study, Finkel and his colleagues (2012) studied how Instigator (i.e., 
provocation), Impellance (i.e., dispositional aggressiveness), and Inhibition (i.e., self-reported 
fatigue, self-control depletion, executive control, and self-reported stress) jointly determined 
intimate partner violence (IPV). The study demonstrated that dispositional aggressiveness 
predicted IPV more robustly when the Instigator was strong and Inhibition was weak. In 
another study, it was also found that IPV was more likely to occur when provocation and 
dispositional retaliatory tendencies were high and commitment to the partner was low (Slotter 
et al., 2012). These findings suggest that I
3
 theory is a refined framework that allows scholars 
to consider key interacting determinants of individual behavior.  
The present research 
In the present research, we sought to investigate the conditions under which 
normative beliefs about aggression predict aggressive behavior. Given that normative beliefs 
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about aggression represent attitudes about the acceptability of aggression (Amjad & Wood, 
2009), they could be viewed as an individual factor representing a form of Impellance within 
the confines of I
3
 theory. In addition, provocation and self-control resources may serve as 
Instigator and Inhibition. Based on relevant literature, we assumed that normative beliefs 
about aggression may better and more consistently predict lower aggressive behavior when 
Instigator is weak and Inhibition is strong
2
.  
First, according to the reflective-impulsive model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), 
individual’s behavior is supposed to be guided by impulsive and reflexive systems. These 
involve respectively (1) automatic affective and approach-avoidance reactions, and (2) moral 
standards and deliberate evaluation. The predictive validity of these two systems depends on 
a number of boundary factors such as self-control resources. For instance, one’s behavior 
would be dominantly predicted by the impulsive system when self-control resources are 
depleted and the reflective system would better predict behavior when such resources are 
intact (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). In this study, we see normative beliefs about 
aggression as a reflective precursor and contend that beliefs about aggression may be more 
influential in guiding behavior when self-control resources are intact than when depleted, 
because the reflective system is assumed to be powered by self-control resources (Hofmann 
et al., 2009; Vohs, 2006). To be more specific, Vohs (2006) suggested the schemata in the 
reflective system need a source of energy to reach the threshold needed for activation, and 
that self-control resources are important as they push the reflective system schemata above 
the required threshold. This view is supported by research by Friese, Hofmann, and Wänke 
                                                             
2 As noted above, due to our scoring system for normative beliefs about aggression was the opposite of that used by 
Huesmann and Guerra (1997), high normative beliefs about aggression would predict lower aggressive behavior. 
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(2008), who found that people’s explicit attitudes significantly predicted their food choice 
and consumption behavior only when self-control resources were not depleted. Thus, when 
peoples’ self-control resources are heightened, their reflective system may be more likely to 
be activated which should in turn generate behavior that is in accordance with their personal 
standards. In line with this idea, normative beliefs about aggression should predict aggressive 
behavior better when self-control resources are full.  
Second, we expect that beliefs about aggression may be more likely to predict 
aggressive behavior when provocation is absent rather than present. A previous 
laboratory-based study did not find a significant effect of direct and indirect aggressiveness 
(assessed explicitly using the Conflict Response Questionnaire) on aggressive behavior 
following provocation. In attempting to explain this unexpected finding, the authors 
suggested “explicit measures would predict aggressive behavior when higher-order cognitive 
processes are activated, modifying and controlling aggression-related tendencies, and thus 
response to provocation is likely to be spontaneous rather than controlled” (Richetin, 
Richardson & Mason, 2010, p.32). In this sense, provocation may be more influential in 
guiding peoples’ automatic – as opposed to controlled – responses. As such, controlled 
responses may be more likely under conditions of non-provocation, leading us to expect that 
beliefs about aggression would be more likely to negatively predict aggressive behavior when 
people are not provoked. 
Based on this, our hypothesis was that beliefs about aggression would predict 
aggressive behavior more accurately when provocation is not present, and when self-control 
resources are complete. Whereas the “perfect storm” thesis depicts a scenario in which 
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aggression is most likely to occur – when Instigator and Impellance are strong and Inhibition 
is weak (Finkel et al., 2012; Slotter et al., 2012) – presently we aim to test an alternative 
scenario, one in which aggression is least likely to occur. This “perfect calm” thesis proposes 
this to be when Instigator and Impellance are weak and Inhibition is strong. Through 
investigation of this issue, we aim to extend the predictive value of I
3
 theory by 
demonstrating that it may not only explain when aggression is most likely to happen, but also 
when aggression is least likely to take place. 
Two experiments were carried out to examine our hypotheses. In both studies, the 
Instigator (i.e., provocation) was manipulated by an ostensible partner giving or not giving 
participants insulting feedback on a paper they had written. In turn, impellance (i.e., 
normative beliefs about aggression) was assessed explicitly. Further, inhibition (i.e., 
self-control resources) was manipulated by requiring participants to perform a depleting task 
(study1: Stroop test; study 2: e-crossing task). Finally, participants played a reaction game 
with a partner in which they had the opportunity to aggress against them. To reduce the 
possibility that completing the assessment of normative beliefs about aggression might 
influence aggressive reactions, this assessment was carried out two weeks before the main 
experiment.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and forty eight Chinese university students (62 male, 86 female, Mage = 
19.13 years; SD =.79 years) recruited via flyers participated in this study in exchange for 30 
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Yuan (approximately 5 U.S. dollars). No participant reported any psychiatric history or 
having ever participated in a similar study.  
Experimental design 
Two between-subjects variables were experimentally manipulated, each having two 
levels (i.e., provocation vs. no-provocation; self-control depletion vs. self-control intact) 
alongside the assessment of one within-subjects individual-difference variable (i.e., 
normative beliefs about aggression). Accordingly, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions (i.e., provocation + depletion; provocation + no-depletion; 
no-provocation + depletion; and no-provocation + no-depletion) before participation in the 
reaction time game. 
Measures
i
 
Normative beliefs about aggression. We adapted the Normative Beliefs about 
Aggression Scale (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997) to assess participants’ beliefs regarding the 
acceptability of aggression. This scale consists of 20 items assessed on a 4-point scale 
ranging from “1 = it’s perfectly OK” to “4 = it’s really wrong”. Higher scores indicate 
respondents are less accepting of aggression. Sample items are “Suppose a boy hits another 
boy, John, do you think it’s wrong for John to hit him back?” and “In general, it is wrong to 
hit other people”. This measure has been shown to be reliable in past research with children 
and adults (Amjad & Skinner, 2008; Amjad & Wood, 2009); the Cronbach’s α in the present 
study was .85. 
Aggressive behavior. The Taylor Competitive Reaction Time game was used to 
measure participants’ aggressive behavior. This task has been frequently used and proved to 
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be a valid measure of aggression (Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999). In this task, 
participants play a game with an ostensible partner for five rounds. Participants are informed 
that “at the beginning of each round, you and your partner should mutually choose the 
duration of a loud and annoying noise to each other, and the loser of the round will hear the 
noise of the corresponding duration set by the other one.” Participants were asked to respond 
by pressing the corresponding directional key (i.e., “←” & “→”) as presented on the screen 
as quickly and accurately as they can. There were 10 levels of duration, from “1 = 0.5 
seconds” to “10 = 5 seconds”, with 0.5 seconds between adjacent levels. According to past 
research (DeWall et al., 2007), the response for the first trial is the best indicator of 
aggression because participants have not yet received aversive noise from their partner. 
Therefore, only the duration in the first trial was recorded and served as the measure of 
aggressive behavior; increased duration indicated greater aggressive behavior.  
Suspicion. After the test finished, we probed suspicion by asking participants to 
write down anything they doubted about the aim and processes of the study. No participants 
reported any suspicions about the study related to aggression.  
Manipulations 
Self-control resource depletion. Self-control resources were manipulated using the 
Stroop task. In this task, several words are presented in fonts of different color, such as the 
word “red” is presented in blue font; and participants are required to speak loudly of the color 
instead of the word. This task requires people to override their dominant response of naming 
the word to naming the color of the word, and therefore it needs self-control resources to 
complete this task. Participants in the depletion condition were asked to complete 300 
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incongruent trials (i.e., the word and the color were mismatched) while those in the 
non-depletion condition completed 300 congruent trials (i.e., the word and the color were 
matched). In order to examine whether the manipulation was successful, participants 
answered two items on a 7-point scale following completion of the task. The first item was 
“How fatigued are you feeling now?”, and was assessed on a 7-point scale ranging from “1 = 
not fatigued at all” to “7 = very much fatigued”. The second item was “How much effort did 
you put into naming the color of the presented word?”, again assessed using a 7-point scale, 
this time ranging from “1 = did not put in any effort at all” to “7 = put in all of my effort”. 
The Stroop task has been used widely in past research to successfully manipulate individual 
self-control resources (e.g., DeWall et al., 2007; Li, Nie, Zeng, Huntoon, & Smith, 2013).  
Provocation. We manipulated provocation by giving or not giving insulting results 
and comments on participants’ writing. We asked participants to write a short passage 
discussing “do you think the advantages of smart phones outweigh disadvantages or their 
disadvantages outweigh advantages”. The experimenter then explained to participants that 
their papers – and those of their partners – would be scored and commented on by their 
partners. In the provocation condition, participants’ writing was given a very low score (5 out 
of 20) and insulting comments (“this is one of the worst papers I have ever read and I 
seriously doubt the ability of the author”) by the experimenter regardless of the actual 
performance, whereas in the no-provocation condition, we did not give any results or 
comments on participants’ writing. This procedure has been used successfully to evoke 
provocation in prior studies (e.g., DeWall et al., 2007).  
Procedures 
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The study consisted of two stages. In the first stage, participants provided their 
written consent and completed the measure of normative beliefs about aggression in the 
laboratory. Once complete, participants were told by the experimenter that they would be 
required to complete another task in the near future. The second stage followed two weeks 
later, when upon arrival at the laboratory participants were informed that the aim of the study 
was to investigate the relationships between writing ability and reaction speed and that they 
would finish this study with another same-sex participant they had met before. Subsequently, 
participants were asked to write a short paper and were informed that their papers would be 
scored and commented on by their partners, and that they would do the same for their 
partner’s paper. When the paper was finished, participants assigned to the depletion condition 
and non-depletion condition, respectively, completed an incongruent or congruent Stroop task 
before completing the manipulation check. Concurrently, the experimenter claimed to take 
the paper to the other participant to score, but actually each paper was scored and commented 
on by the experimenter in the adjacent room regardless of actual performance. Momentarily, 
the experimenter returned with a pre-written paper for the participant to score and comment 
upon. This paper matched the participant’s attitude about smart phones (e.g., if participant 
favored the advantages of smart phones, then the paper presented to participant was also in 
favor of the advantages of smart phones) and the handwriting was matched to the 
participant’s gender (e.g., if participant was a male, then a paper prewritten by another male 
was presented); both measures were aimed to maximize the believability of the process. After 
participants finished scoring their partner’s paper and providing comments, the experimenter 
took the scored paper to the adjacent room and returned with the participant’s own paper a 
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few seconds later. Then, participants allocated to the provocation condition played the 
reaction time game on the computer after reading the score and comments supposedly given 
by their “partner” and those in the no-provocation condition did not receive the feedback on 
their papers. Finally, when the game was over participants were thanked and paid, and 
subsequently debriefed through e-mail to the true nature of the study once data collection was 
complete. 
Data analyses 
In order to clearly explain the combined effects of normative beliefs about 
aggression (centered), self-control resources depletion, and provocation on aggressive 
behavior, several statistics were carried out to analyze our data. Specifically, we first 
examined whether the three-way interaction involving all variables was significant. Second, 
we examined the two-way interaction between normative beliefs about aggression and 
self-control resources for provocation vs. no-provocation conditions to judge these 
conditional effects (i.e., the slope test) on a third variable (i.e., provocation). Subsequently, 
the four one-way associations between normative beliefs about aggression and aggressive 
behavior for the four conditions were examined. Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro (version 
2.13) embedded in SPSS 18.0 was used to conduct all these analyses. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
Participants in the self-control resources depletion condition felt more fatigue (M = 
2.91, SD = 1.11) than did those in non-depletion condition (M = 2.46, SD = 1.11), t(146) = 
2.44, p = .016, d = .40). Moreover, depleted participants had put more effort into the Stroop 
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task (M = 4.34, SD = 1.54) than had the non-depleted participants (M = 3.53, SD = 1.85), 
t(146) = 2.90, p = .004, d = .48, suggesting the manipulation of self-control resources 
depletion was successful.  
Examination of the joint effect of normative beliefs about aggression, provocation, and 
self-control depletion on aggressive behavior 
Means and standard deviations for normative beliefs about aggression and 
aggressive behavior for the entire sample and the four experimental groups are displayed in 
Table 1. To examine whether the three independent variables, or any of the four interaction 
terms predicted aggressive behavior, a multiple regression analysis was conducted. 
Controlling for gender, the resultant model was significant, R
2
 = .132, F(8,139) = 2.643, p 
= .010, and the three-way interaction term was found to be a significant predictor of 
aggressive behavior, B = -2.669, S.E. = 1.211, t(139) = -2.229, p = .027 (see Table 2). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Subsequent simple slopes analyses demonstrated the “normative beliefs about 
aggression × self-control resources” interaction was not significant when provocation was 
present, B = 1.057, S.E. = .886, t(139) = 1.192, p = .235, but that it was when provocation 
was absent, B = -1.642, S.E. = .825, t(139) = -1.991, p = .048. Furthermore, a slope difference 
test found that these two slopes were significantly different, t(144) = 2.22, p = .028
3
.  
Breaking down the “normative beliefs about aggression × self-control resources” 
interaction for the no-provocation condition, the simple slope of the association between 
normative beliefs about aggression and aggressive behavior was stronger for the no-depletion 
                                                             
3 Throughout the paper, differences in slope were tested on http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=103 
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condition, B = -1.507, S.E. = .545, t(139) = -2.766, p =.006, than for the depletion condition, 
B = .135, S.E. = .620, t(139) = .217, p = .828 (Table 3 and Figure 1). A slope difference test 
found that these two slopes were significantly different, t(70) = 1.99, p = .050. As an 
auxiliary analysis, we carried out an independent t-test to investigate whether the key 
predicted means (adjusted predicted value) for the “high normative beliefs about aggression + 
no-provocation + depletion” condition and “high normative beliefs about aggression + 
no-provocation + no-depletion” condition differed from each other. The mean in the former 
condition (M = 1.22, SD = .17) was significantly higher than the one in the latter condition 
(M = .73, SD = .18), t(13) = 5.149, p < .001. Collectively, the results from study 1 supported 
the perfect calm proposition and contradicted the perfect storm prediction.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 & FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Study 2 
The aim of study 2 was twofold. First, we aimed to conceptually replicate the 
findings of study 1 using an alternative self-control depletion task (i.e., the “e-crossing” task). 
Second, whereas in study 1 we used just the initial trial of the experimental task as our 
measure of aggression, we aimed to determine whether normative beliefs about aggression 
could also predict the average levels of aggression across all trials. Whilst we expected to 
replicate the findings from study 1 when the initial trial was used as the indicator of 
aggression we did not anticipate detecting a significant effect when the average trial was used. 
These disparate outcomes were anticipated based upon the contention that perceived 
aggression from opponents in trials two onwards can influence the levels of aggression 
observed, making them difficult to interpret (e.g., DeWall et al., 2007). 
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty four Chinese university students recruited via flyers 
participated in this study in exchange for 30 Yuan (approximately 5 U.S. dollars). Four 
participants were deleted due to technical issues with the software program used in the 
experiment to record the dependent variable, leaving 180 participants (74 male, 106 female, 
Mage = 19.71 years; SD =.88 years) for data analyses. No participant reported any psychiatric 
history or having participated in a similar study previously.  
Experimental design 
The experimental design of study 2 was identical to that from study 1. 
Measures 
Normative beliefs about aggression. The adapted version of the Normative Beliefs 
about Aggression Scale (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997) used in Study 1 was again employed to 
assess beliefs about aggression in Study 2; Cronbach’s α in Study 2 was .81. 
Aggressive behavior. Aggressive behavior was assessed using the same methods as 
used in Study 1. However, in addition to using trial 1 (i.e., aggressive behavior trial 1) as the 
sole dependent variable as in study 1, we also created an alternative dependent variable by 
averaging the results of all five trials (i.e., aggressive behavior average) in order to examine 
whether normative beliefs about aggression could predict the aggressive outcome generated 
by all the trials. Across the five trials, we artificially assigned that participants would win 
three times and lose twice, with outcomes occurring at random. When participants lost the 
trial, they experienced a predetermined noxious noise (a harmless noise of 70 DB for 1.5 
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seconds) through the headphones. 
Suspicion. Suspicion was probed using the same method as in study 1. 
Manipulations 
Self-control resource depletion. Self-control resources were manipulated using the 
“e-crossing” task. This task consisted of two stages. In the first stage, participants were 
required to cross out the letter “e” each time it appears in a passage for a period of five 
minutes. In the second phase, using a separate passage participants in the depletion condition 
were asked to cross out the letter “e” except when they are next- or one-letter-adjacent-to a 
vowel, again for five minutes. In contrast, participants in the non-depletion condition follow 
the same rules as in the first stage. The first phase of the task is designed to encourage 
participants to establish a habitual response, whereas the second phase is intended to either 
break (depletion condition) or maintain (non-depletion condition) this habituated response. 
This manipulation is based on the premise that breaking habitual responses requires 
self-control, and has been used successfully to manipulate self-control resources in previous 
studies (e.g., DeWall et al., 2007; Friese, Messner, & Schaffner, 2012). 
Provocation. Provocation was manipulated in the same manner as in study 1. 
Procedures 
With the exception of replacing the “Stroop” task with the “e-crossing” task, the 
procedures in study 2 were identical to those followed in study 1. Questions posed to 
participants following completion of the experiment again revealed that no participants 
interpreted the experiment to be about aggressive behavior, or doubted the authenticity of 
their partner. Finally, all participants were thanked and paid, and debriefed as to the true 
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nature of the experiment via e-mail once all data collection was complete. 
Data analyses 
The statistical analyses were identical to those in study 1. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
Regarding the manipulation of self-control resources, participants in the self-control 
resource depletion condition felt more fatigue (M = 3.97, SD = 1.35) than did those in the 
non-depletion condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.33), t(178) = 6.96, p < .01, d = 1.04. Moreover, 
depleted participants reported putting more effort into the “e-crossing” task (M = 4.91, SD = 
1.46) than non-depleted participants (M = 3.93, SD = 1.43), t(178) = 4.54, p < .01, d = .68, 
suggesting that the manipulation of self-control resources was successful. 
Examination of the joint effects of normative belief about aggression, provocation, and 
self-control depletion on aggressive behavior 
Means and standard deviations for normative beliefs about aggression and 
aggressive behavior for the entire sample and the four experimental groups are displayed in 
Table 4. To examine whether the three independent variables, or any of the four interaction 
terms predicted aggressive behavior trial 1, a multiple regression analysis was conducted. 
Controlling for gender, the resultant model was significant, R
2
 = .139, F(8, 171) = 3.452, p 
= .001. As shown in Table 5, the three-way interaction was a significant predictor of, B = 
-3.398, S.E. = 1.175, t(171) = -2.893, p = .004. Furthermore, simple slopes analyses for the 
“normative beliefs about aggression × self-control resources” interaction demonstrated that 
such interaction was not significant when provocation was present, B = 1.243, S.E. = .787, 
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t(171) = 1.581, p = .116, but that it was when provocation was absent, B = -2.155, S.E. = .867, 
t(171) = -2.485, p = .014. Additionally, a slope difference test showed that these two slopes 
were significantly different, t(176) = 2.902, p = .004. Breaking down this interaction for the 
no-provocation condition, the simple slope of the association of normative beliefs about 
aggression with aggressive behavior was stronger for the no-depletion condition, B = -1.294, 
S.E. = .687, t(171) = -1.83, p =.061, than for the depletion condition, B = .861, S.E. = .525, 
t(171) = 1.640, p = .103 (Table 6 and Figure 2). A slope difference test found that these two 
slopes were significantly different from one another, t(87) = 2.492, p = .015. As an auxiliary 
analysis, we carried out an independent t-test to investigate whether the key predicted means 
(adjusted predicted value) for the “high normative beliefs about aggression + no-provocation 
+ depletion” condition and “high normative beliefs about aggression + no-provocation + 
no-depletion” condition differed from one another. Results of this analysis showed that the 
mean in the former condition (M = 2.18, SD = .18) was significantly higher than that in the 
latter condition (M = .91, SD = .25), t(11) = 10.77, p < .001.  
As shown in Figure 2, the slope for the “provocation + depletion” condition 
demonstrated a similar effect to that for the “no-provocation + no-depletion” condition. As a 
result, we tested for differences between these two slopes, and found that they were not 
significantly different from one another, t(87) = .450, p = .654. This suggested that although 
the perfect calm scenario was supported to some degree in Study 2. The effect was not unique 
because except the slope for the “no-provocation and no-depletion” condition, slopes for all 
other conditions were similar to those in Study 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 4, 5, & 6 ABOUT HERE] 
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
This regression analysis was then repeated with aggressive behavior average as the 
dependent variable. In this analysis, the model was again significant, R
2
 = .147, F(8, 171) = 
3.680, p = .001. Further, as shown in Table 4, the three-way interaction was again significant, 
B = -2.710, S.E. = 1.222, t(171) = -2.216, p = .028. Subsequent simple slopes analyses for 
this interaction indicated that the slope for the interaction was not significant when 
provocation was present, B = 1.275, S.E. = .818, t(171) = 1.558, p = .121, or absent, B = 
-1.435, S.E. = .902, t(171) = -1.590, p = .114. Also, the one-way slopes of the four conditions 
were not significant (Table 6). Therefore, no further analyses were undertaken. 
General discussion 
In two studies, the present research, guided by I
3
 theory, investigated the combined 
effect of normative beliefs about aggression, provocation, and self-control resources 
depletion on aggressive behavior. The effect of normative beliefs about aggression on 
aggression has been intensively studied using designs that employ subjective informant (i.e., 
self-reported and other-reported) measures of aggression and correlational designs (e.g., 
Amjad & Skinner, 2008; Ang et al., 2011; Werner & Nixon, 2005). Building upon and 
extending the findings of these studies, the present work employed a behavioral experiment 
methodology to investigate the effect of normative beliefs about aggression on aggressive 
behavior. The findings of both studies suggest that normative beliefs about aggression only 
predict aggressive behavior (as assessed by Taylor’s competitive reaction time task and 
indicated by the first trial) in laboratory conditions when provocation is not present, and 
self-control resources are intact. In other words, the ability of normative beliefs about 
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aggression to predict aggressive outcomes appears to be dependent on other boundary 
variables.  
Guided by the I
3
 theory, previous studies have demonstrated that an Impellance (e.g., 
trait aggressiveness and retaliation tendencies) better predict aggression when the Instigator 
is strong and Inhibition is weak (Finkel et al., 2012; Slotter et al., 2012). These impelling 
factors could be seen as impulsive precursors. People high in trait aggressiveness or 
retaliation tendencies may have formed automatic aggressive/retaliatory cognitive and 
affective reactions. Such precursors may become dominant factors that guide behavior when 
triggered and self-control fails (Hofmann et al., 2009). Therefore, previous studies have 
supported the presence of a “perfect storm” scenario for the occurrence of aggression. 
However, our findings suggest that the highest levels of aggression occurred in Study 1 when 
participants with strong anti-aggressive norms were assigned to the “Provocation + 
No-depletion” condition, which apparently contradicted the perfect storm proposition. In 
contrast, in Study 2 participants with weak anti-aggressive norms assigned to the 
“Provocation + Depletion” condition displayed the highest levels of aggression, which 
supports the perfect storm proposition. At this point we are unable to explain this 
inconsistency across the two studies, and encourage future research to further investigate the 
perfect storm scenario guided by I
3
 theory, which may help elucidate this unexpected finding.  
In contrast with the “perfect storm” proposition, the present study provided initial 
support for the existence of a “perfect calm” scenario through the investigation of a deterrent 
impelling factor (i.e., normative beliefs about aggression) on aggressive behavior. As noted 
above, normative beliefs about aggression are viewed as a reflective precursor, and 
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maintaining one’s attitudes and beliefs requires self-control (Baumeister et al., 2007; Vohs, 
2006). Reflective precursors may therefore predict one’s behavior when self-control 
resources are intact (Hofmann et al., 2009) and provocation is not present (Richetin et al., 
2010). As such, the current study investigated and provided evidence supporting a “perfect 
calm” scenario for aggression. Due to the difference in nature of the Impellance examined in 
previous studies (Finkel et al., 2012; Slotter et al., 2012) and the current study, we assume 
that a “perfect storm” may occur when the impelling factor is an impulsive precursor (e.g., 
trait aggressiveness) and a “perfect calm” may transpire when the impellor is a reflective 
precursor (e.g., normative beliefs about aggression). In this sense, the I
3
 theory can be used to 
help understand conditions under which people are less likely to aggress, as well as when 
people are most likely to.  
It is important to note that the “perfect calm” proposition was only partially – and 
not uniformly – supported. First in Study 2 the slopes for “Provocation + Depletion” and 
“No-provocation + No-depletion” were not significantly different from one another. Further, 
the slope of normative beliefs about aggression in the “no-provocation + no-depletion” was 
only marginally significant. Nevertheless, overall the current results are in more favor of the 
“perfect calm” proposition. However, clearly both the “perfect calm” and “perfect storm” 
theses require further investigation as there are few studies examining the three-way 
interaction of the I
3
 theory, with the current study being the first to find the “perfect calm” as 
far as we are aware. Nevertheless, the current study demonstrates that the effect of 
personality variables on aggressive behavior may be better understood when Instigators and 
Inhibitors are accounted for.  
I3 THEORY AND AGGRESSION                                                                      24 
 
 
 
As anticipated, the study hypotheses were only supported when the first trial of the 
aggressive task was used as the dependent variable, and not when the average level of all 
trials served as the dependent measure. However, it is important to note (see Table 6) that 
three out of four slopes were similar for the first trial analyses when compared to the 
equivalent slopes from the average trial analyses, with the slopes for the “no-provocation + 
no-depletion” condition being the exception. Thus, although our main prediction was tested 
using the first trial but not the average trial, we are aware that the current results do not 
unambiguously discount the use of the average trail as an indicator of aggression given the 
clear similarities for three of the four conditions. In past research, it was assumed that the first 
trial of an aggressive task is the response caused by antecedent factors (e.g., provocation, 
self-control depletion, DeWall et al., 2007) and that subsequent trials may be difficult to 
interpret because they are also affected by additional factors. However, some studies have 
demonstrated the utility of using the average trial as the dependent variable when using 
Taylor’s competitive reaction game (e.g., Anderson & Dill, 2000). Given that in the current 
study only five trials were included, and win/loss outcomes occurred at random, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that using the average trials as the dependent variable may have 
proved more successful when testing the study hypotheses if more trials had been used and/or 
the win/loss pattern had been fixed. As such, further research is needed to investigate this 
possibility.   
High normative beliefs about aggression (i.e., disapproval of aggression) should be 
negatively related to aggression. However, results from both studies demonstrate that under 
certain circumstances (e.g., “no-provocation + depletion”) normative beliefs about aggression 
I3 THEORY AND AGGRESSION                                                                      25 
 
 
 
may be positively related to aggressive behavior. We are not aware of any plausible 
theoretical reasons for these slopes to be positive. Also, there is a lack of research addressing 
the predictive validity of normative beliefs about aggression on aggressive behavior in such 
settings. As such, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of these findings at present, or to 
conclude that they were the result of measurement error given that the slopes were not 
statistically significant. However, we encourage researchers to investigate this topic further to 
help understand the mechanisms that may lead to this situation-specific effect.  
The current study has implications for social-cognitive models of aggression (e.g., 
the General Aggression Model, GAM, Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson & Huesmann, 
2003) regarding the role of self-control. The current study supported the existence of a 
“perfect calm” scenario which helps indicate when human aggression may be least likely to 
occur. This suggests that social-cognitive models of aggression can also be useful in guiding 
investigations into the non-occurrence of aggression. Such research has the potential to 
promote and inform intervention programs targeting aggression that not only seek to suppress 
the effects of potential risk factors (e.g., trait aggressiveness), but also look to facilitate likely 
preventive factors (e.g., normative beliefs about aggression).  
As with any research, the current research has limitations. First, the chosen indicator 
of aggressive behavior was relatively mild and indirect in comparison to some indicators (e.g., 
physical fighting), and this may have precluded the inhibition of aggression. For example, a 
previous study found that even when people had high levels of moral disengagement (i.e., the 
conditional endorsement of aggressive behavior; Bandura, 1991), the predicted effect of trait 
self-control on physical aggression was still significant (Li et al., 2014). This may be because 
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people are unlikely to engage in aggressive behavior if it has the potential to cause physical 
harm (c.f., Slaby & Guerra, 1988; Slotter & Finkel, 2011), even if they have the potential to 
rationalize such conduct through moral disengagement. As such, the joint effect of 
provocation, normative beliefs about aggression and self-control resource depletion on 
aggressive behavior may have differed if we had chosen an indicator of aggression with more 
serious consequences for the recipient. Therefore, future research should attempt to replicate 
the current findings with more intensive dependent variables (within appropriate ethical 
boundaries). In addition, the current study sampled only Chinese university students, which 
limits the generalizability of the current findings to other populations. Therefore, we 
encourage researchers to attempt to replicate the present findings using alternative 
populations.  
Despite its limitations, this study makes some important contributions to the 
literature. First, it demonstrates that normative beliefs about aggression serve as a predictor of 
aggressive behavior under laboratory conditions only under specific conditions. More 
specifically, although previous studies have demonstrated that normative beliefs about 
aggression predict aggressive behavior in laboratory settings (Levinson, Giancola, & Parrott, 
2011), the current study extends research in this area by showing that such effects may only 
be valid when provocation is absent and self-control resources are not depleted. Second, 
although I
3
 theory provides a general framework to explain aggression, to date it has been 
more theoretical than empirical (Finkel, 2014; Finkel et al., 2012). To our knowledge – prior 
to the current research – very few studies have employed this theory to investigate the 
three-way interaction between Instigation, Impellance and Inhibition for aggression (i.e., 
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Finkel et al., 2012; Slotter et al., 2012). As such, this study provides much needed empirical 
support for this contemporary theory. Third, the perfect storm thesis proposed in the I
3
 theory 
considers when aggression is most likely to occur. The current study of a perfect calm 
scenario – when aggression may be least likely to occur – may also be explained through I
3
 
theory.  
To conclude, although aggressive behavior is clearly very complicated, the present 
study adds to our ever-evolving understanding of such behavior. It does so by identifying 
conditions under which normative beliefs about aggression are most likely to prevent 
aggressive behavior. We encourage future researchers to conduct research attempting to 
replicate the “perfect storm” and/or “perfect calm” propositions by investigating alternative 
boundary factors when investigating the effect of dispositional variables on aggression. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for normative beliefs about aggression and aggressive behavior in Study 1 
 Full sample 
(N = 148) 
Provocation + Depletion 
(N = 37) 
Provocation + No-depletion 
(N = 37) 
No-provocation + Depletion 
(N = 37) 
No-provocation + No-depletion 
(N = 37) 
NBAGG 3.23 ± .31 3.19 ± .29 3.21 ± .30 3.22 ± .30 3.30 ± .34 
Aggressive behavior 1.60 ± 1.17 1.93 ± 1.39 1.89 ± 1.40 1.28 ± .82 1.31 ± .88 
Note: NBAGG = normative beliefs about aggression. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Examination of the joint predicted effect of normative beliefs about aggression, provocation, and depletion on aggressive behavior in 
Study 1 
 B S.E. t p 
Gender -.131 .190 -.689 .492 
NBAGG (centered) -.266 .637 -.417 677 
Provocation -.62 .26 -2.33 .021
*
 
Self-control resources  .006 .264 .023 .981 
NBAGG × Provocation .400 .887 .452 .652 
NBAGG × Self-control resources 1.057 .886 1.192 .235 
Provocation × Self-control resources .118 .375 .316 .753 
NBAGG × Provocation × Self-control resources -2.699 1.211 -2.229 .027
*
 
Note: dependent variable: selected duration of annoying noise; NBAGG = normative beliefs about aggression; Provocation = 0, No-provocation = 1; Self-control 
resources: Depletion = 0, No-depletion = 1; gender: male = 1, female = 2;  
* p < .05. 
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Table 3 Slopes of normative beliefs about aggression for the four conditions in Study 1 
 B S.E. t p 
Provocation + Depletion -.266 .637 -.417 .677 
Provocation + No-depletion .791 .621 1.274 .205 
No-provocation + Depletion .135 .620 .217 .828 
No-provocation + No-depletion -1.507 .545 -2.766 .006 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for normative beliefs about aggression and aggressive behavior in Study 2 
 Full 
sample 
(N = 180) 
Provocation + 
Depletion 
(N = 45) 
Provocation + 
Non-depletion 
(N = 44) 
Non-provocation + 
Depletion 
(N = 45) 
Non-provocation + 
Non-depletion 
(N = 46) 
NBAGG 2.92 ± .30 2.95 ± .31 2.95 ± .32 2.92 ± .33 2.87 ± .25 
Aggressive behavior trial 
1 
1.58 ± 1.22 2.01 ± 1.38 1.10 ± .65 1.70 ± 1.47 1.49 ± 1.04 
Aggressive behavior 
average 
1.64 ± 1.27 2.08 ± 1.40 1.12 ± .66 1.88 ± 1.58 1.49 ± 1.07 
Note: NBAGG = normative beliefs about aggression. 
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Table 5 Examination of the joint predicted effect of normative beliefs about aggression, provocation, and depletion on aggressive behavior in 
Study 2 
 Aggressive behavior trial 1  Aggressive behavior average 
 B S.E. t p  B S.E. t p 
Gender -.296 .180 -1.641 .103  -.450 .188 -2.402 .017
*
 
NBAGG (centered) -.894 .565 -1.581 .116  -.908 .588 -1.453 .125 
Provocation -.357 .245 -1.460 .146  -.265 .255 -1.039 .300 
Self-control resources  -.949 .246 -3.857 < .001
**
  -1.003 .256 -3.915 < .001
**
 
NBAGG × Provocation 1.755 .772 2.274 .024
*
  1.675 .803 2.086 .038
*
 
NBAGG × Self-control resources 1.243 .787 1.581 .116  1.275 .818 1.558 .121 
Provocation × Self-control resources .618 .348 1.774 .078
†
  .500 .362 1.379 .170 
NBAGG × Provocation × Self-control resources -3.398 1.175 -2.893 .004
**
  -2.710 1.222 -2.216 .028
*
 
Note: dependent variable: selected duration of annoying noise; NBAGG = normative beliefs about aggression; Provocation = 0, No-provocation = 1; Self-control 
resources: Depletion = 0, No-depletion = 1; gender: male = 1, female = 2;  
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Slopes of normative beliefs about aggression for the four conditions in Study 2  
 Aggressive behavior trial 1  Aggressive behavior average 
 B S.E. t p  B S.E. t p 
Provocation + Depletion -.894 .565 -1.581 .116  -.908 .588 -1.543 .125 
Provocation + No-depletion .350 .547 .640 .523  .367 .569 .645 .520 
No-provocation + Depletion .861 .525 1.640 .103  .767 .546 1.404 .162 
No-provocation + No-depletion -1.294 .687 -1.883 .061
†
  -.668 .715 -.934 .352 
Note: † p < .07. 
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Figure 1 Provocation, normative beliefs about aggression, self-control resources, and aggressive behavior (Study 1) 
Note: Low NB: low normative beliefs about aggression (-1 SD); Medium NB: medium normative beliefs about aggression (-1 SD ~ +1 SD); High NB: high 
normative beliefs about aggression (+1 SD) 
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Figure 2 Provocation, normative beliefs about aggression, self-control resources, and aggressive behavior (Study 2) 
Note: Low NB: low normative beliefs about aggression (-1 SD); Medium NB: medium normative beliefs about aggression (-1 SD ~ +1 SD); High NB: high 
normative beliefs about aggression (+1 SD) 
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i
 Implicit aggressiveness. In our original study, we also employed the single-target implicit association test (ST-IAT) to investigate participants’ 
implicit aggressive tendency (as another potential Impellor). This test included three target words describing the self (e.g., me), and six attribute 
words describing aggressiveness (e.g., revenge, retaliation) and another six attribute words describing peace (e.g., benevolence, mercy). The 
attribute words were initially assessed by 324 college students on a 7-point scale ranging from “1 = not aggressive / peaceful at all” to “7 = 
most aggressive / peaceful” in a pilot test. The top six words for each attribute (all mean scores higher than 5.5) were selected as being most 
representative of aggressiveness / peace. The ST-IAT included three blocks. In the first block, participants indicated which category (aggression 
/ peace) each word presented on the screen belonged to as accurately and quickly as they could. In the second block, participants pressed the “E” 
button to respond to “aggressive” and “the self” words, and the “I” button for “peaceful” words. In the third block, participants pressed the “E” 
button to respond to “aggressive” words and the “I” button for “peaceful” and “the self” words. The ratio of pressing “E” and “I” was 3:2 in the 
second block and 2:3 in the third block. In order to avoid a possible order effect, the second and third blocks were counterbalanced. The 
D-algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) was utilized to indicate respondents’ implicit aggressive tendency. This test was administered 
in the first session of the study two weeks before the manipulation. However, we calculated the internal consistency reliability of the ST-IAT 
using every fourth trial of D scores, finding that the reliability was extremely low (< .40). Although some studies have demonstrated that the 
implicit test is a reliable measure (e.g., Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), other studies argue that its level of reliability does not represent that 
needed to indicate satisfactory psychometric properties (e.g., Bosson, Swann Jr., & Pennebaker, 2000; Teige, Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, 
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2004). Based on the low levels of reliability for the ST-IAT in the current study, we decided not to report the findings obtained using the implicit 
measure. 
 
